We model a stylized banking system where banks are characterized by the amount of capital, cash reserves and their exposure to the interbank loan market as borrowers as well as lenders. A network of interbank lending is established that is used as a transmission mechanism for the failure of banks through the system. We trigger a potential banking crisis by exogenously failing a bank and investigate the spread of this failure within the banking system. We find the obvious result that the size of the bank initially failing is the dominant factor whether contagion occurs, but for the extent of its spread the characteristics of the network of interbank loans are most important. These results have implications for the regulation of banking systems that are briefly discussed, most notably that a reliance on balance sheet regulations is not sufficient but must be supplemented by considerations for the structure of financial linkages between banks.
Introduction 7
The current financial crisis has raised questions about the adequacy of financial regulation to ensure the stability 8 of the banking system. A particular feature was the threat of systemic risk, where the failure of one bank spreads to 9 other banks, arising from financial links between them. These financial links, either through interbank loans, payment 
151
We will assume that the total assets A i of a bank follow a power law distribution as has been found to be empirically 152 valid.
153
While this balance sheet does not capture all aspects of the real balance sheet of banks, e. g. there is no provision
154
of fixed assets such as buildings, the proposed structure includes all those balance sheet positions that make the vast 155 majority of the total assets and liabilities and all those that are relevant for our analysis. A few additional assumptions 156 are required in order to make our model of banks feasible for analysis. Firstly we assume that all interbank loans are � � 159 banks, taking into account the costs of recalling these types of loans. This recovery rate might also be interpreted 160 as the liquidity impact from selling assets in a banking crisis. We finally assume that no deposits are withdrawn or 161 added, no new loans to customers are granted or repaid and the bank is not exposed to any other risks that could cause 162 them losses. While these assumptions may seem very restrictive, they allow us to focus exclusively on the impact of 163 interbank loans on systemic risk without being impeded by other factors. 
The interbank network

165
In order to establish a complete banking system we need to model explicitly the network of interbank loans. A bank 166 does not give a loan to every other bank and does not receive loans from every other bank, hence we need to determine 167 those banks that have a loan arrangement. We therefore generate a random directed network of such loans using a
168
Albert-Barabasi scale-free network, see Barabasi and Albert (1999) , in which the number of outgoing and incoming
169
links are correlated with the total asset value of the bank; this network gives us an adjacency matrix Θ i j {i, j=1,2,...,N} .
170
In this network structure an incoming link from another bank corresponds this bank taking an interbank loan from 171 the other bank; an outgoing link therefore corresponds to a loan given to another bank. Using this network structure 172 provides us with a power law distribution of the in and out degrees which was observed empirically as described in 173 section 2.2, because we assume that the asset values A i are following a power law distribution as outlined above.
174
Therefore using this network structure provides us with a banking system that exhibits properties that were previously 175 established empirically and that other network types, e. g. random networks, cannot provide.
176
Once we have established which banks are linked by interbank loans we need to determine their size. We set the are no longer showing equal assets and liabilities; we thus have to make adjustments to the balance sheets which we 180 describe in more detail in section 4.1. While these adjustments do not perfectly preserve the power law distribution of 181 the assets and the correlation of total assets and number of interbank loans, the distortion is sufficiently small to show 182 no significant differences to the properties of actual banking systems. the initial failure of a bank leads to the failure of at least one additional bank through one of these mechanisms. The 187 extent of contagion is measured by the fraction of banks that are failing through these mechanisms.
188
If a bank incurs a loss that exceeds its equity, the bank is wound up. In this wind-up process the bank calls in all 189 interbank loans given to other banks as well as loans given to customers; from the latter the bank is assumed only to several banks that failed. We call this mechanism the default mechanism.
199
Figure 3 illustrates this mechanism. We assume that banks 1 and 2 are to be liquidated and thereby repaying their exceeding its equity and it will therefore be wound up in a subsequent step. Bank B has sufficient equity to cover 203 these losses and will therefore not be directly affected and continue to exist, albeit with a lower equity than before.
204
Bank C would be able to survive the losses incurred from either bank 1 or bank 2, but the cumulative losses from both of these banks repaying their interbank loans causes cumulative losses exceeding its equity and it will therefore 206 be liquidated in a subsequent step. It must be stressed that it is not necessary for banks 1 and 2 to be liquidated in 207 the same step, but it could be that bank 2 was liquidated prior to bank 1 and the losses arising for bank C on this 208 occasion had reduced its equity and once bank 1 was liquidated, these losses would have eliminated its remaining 209 equity, causing it to default. The liquidation of banks A and C may then in subsequent steps causer other banks to fail.
210
Another problem arises when calling in any interbank loans as the bank from which the loan has been called in 211 will be required to fulfill this request using its cash reserves. If it is not able to do so, the bank will be wound up 212 in order to obtain the cash required, employing the default mechanism described above, and thereby in turn call in 213 interbank loans. We thus have a second mechanism which can lead to the failure of banks, the failure mechanism that 214 arises from a cash shortage. This failure mechanism can lead to default as the recovery of loans to customers will 215 depend on the recovery rate κ and a low recovery rate may not allow all interbank loans to be repaid, causing losses 216 to other banks. Figure 4 illustrates the failure mechanism. We assume again that banks 1 and 2 are to be liquidated and thereby
218
calling in their interbank loans to banks A, B and C for bank 1 and bank C for bank 2. Bank A has insufficient cash 219 reserves to repay the entire interbank loan called in and therefore will be wound up in a subsequent step. Bank B has 220 sufficient cash reserves to cover the interbank loan called in and will therefore not be directly affected and continue to 221 exist, albeit with lower cash reserves than before. Bank C would be able to survive if either bank 1 or bank 2 called in 222 their interbank loans, but the cumulative cash requirements from both banks calling in their interbank loans exceeds 223 them and it will therefore be liquidated in a subsequent step. It must again be stressed that it is not necessary for 224 banks 1 and 2 to be liquidated in the same step, but it could be that bank 2 was liquidated prior to bank 1 and the 225 cash reserves of bank C on this occasion had reduced and once bank 1 was liquidated, these cash reserves would have 226 been insufficient to repay this second interbank loan. The liquidation of banks A and C may then in subsequent steps 227 causer other banks to fail.
228
Thus the failure of a single bank can spread through the system and cause more banks to fail through either of the 229 above mechanism and cause the contagion of the failure of more banks, a banking crisis. The banking crisis is started exogenously by assuming that a single bank fails. This bank is assumed to suffer 232 losses equal to its equity and is then wound up, starting the contagion mechanism described above. We are interested 233 in the conditions that lead to the spread of this initial failure and how far it spreads, i. e. how many banks will 234 be affected. Hence, in contrast to much of the literature we do not seek to evaluate the performance of a generally 235 weakened banking system, but that of a strong banking system with a single bank collapsing for exogenous reasons, 236 e. g. fraud or losses arising from operational risks. This approach allows us to focus solely on the impact of interbank 237 loans on the spread of any failures rather than investigating the influence of a generally weakening banking system. 
The computer experiments
239
Given the complexity of the model outlined above, it is not possible to derive analytical solutions. We therefore 240 employ computer simulations of a large number of banking systems with a wide range of characteristics in order to 241 obtain data that can be analyzed in a subsequent step. 
Parameters used
243
We investigate banking systems with N ∈ [13; 1, 000] banks, randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. For 244 each bank we determine the total value of the assets A i ∈ [100; 10, 000, 000, 000] drawn from a powerlaw distribution 245 with power law exponent λ ∈ [1.5; 5], which in turn is drawn from a uniform distribution for each system. The 
251
After having set up all banks in the banking system, we determine the allocation of interbank loans as de 252 scribed in the model above. Using
and then adjust the other balance sheet items according to
. We use this adjustment to ensure that the balance sheets of individual banks are show 255 ing equal assets and liabilities as well as retaining as much of the initial balance sheet structure as possible. The so 256 adjusted balance sheets of banks are then used in the following analysis and it is this actual balance sheet structure 257 that is used in the further analysis. Distortions in terms of deviations from the power law distribution of the size of 258 assets are minimal as are any deviations in the correlation between assets and the number of interbank loans.
259
We choose a single bank in the system to fail exogenously. The bank chosen can be the largest bank, the second 260 largest bank in terms of their assets, or a random bank from each of the ten size deciles following these two banks. We 261 let the contagion spread until no more failures are observed and record any failures of banks. In total we use 10,000 262 banking systems as set out before, each triggered by 12 different banks individually, giving a total of 120,000 potential 263 banking crises to investigate with approximately 5,000,000 individual banks.
264
Before investigating the results of the model and considering the variables we investigate, we briefly illustrate the given and taken as per our model) and the number of banks in a banking system. We clearly observe that for low 268 power law exponents there exists one bank that dominates the network in terms of size and also interbank loans given In order to determine the main factors that affect the extent of contagion, we will investigate the fraction of banks 280 failing in a banking system, i. e. the number of banks failing divided by the total number of banks in the banking 281 system, denoted FRACTION FAILING.
282
As explanatory variables we use the balance sheet structure of the banks: EQUITY denotes the amount of equity
For each range of power law exponents we show one representative network with a small number of banks (13 ≤ N ≤ 50), a mid-sized banking system (50 < N ≤ 200) and a large banking system (200 < N ≤ 1000). The individual banks are represented by nodes whose size is proportional to their relative size in the banking system they belong to and the interbank loans are the vertices whose thickness is proportional to the relative size of the loan. We only show the largest component of the network, eliminating any isolated nodes. (capital) relative to the total assets of a bank (α i ), RESERVES denotes the amount of cash reserves relative to the 284 total assets (ρ i ), LOANS GIVEN denotes the amount of interbank loans given relative to the total assets (1 − ρ i − β i ),
285
LOANS TAKEN are the amount of interbank loans taken relative to the total assets (1 − α i − γ i ), and SIZE denotes 286 the absolute amount of total assets of a bank (A i ).
287
The number of interbank loans given to other banks is denoted by NUMBER GIVEN while the number of inter 288 bank loans taken from other banks is NUMBER TAKEN, i. e. they represent the outdegree and indegree, respectively.
289
In addition to the number of interbank loans, we also investigate the concentration of interbank loans from and to loans taken from other banks with
and subsequently normalized as before.
294
We furthermore investigate a number of variables that describe the network structure of interbank loans in more 
. A good overview of these network properties and how to measure them is given in (Newman, 2010 , Ch. 7).
310
As we investigate the aggregate failure within a banking system and how the overall network structure affects systemic 311 risk, the unweighed average across all banks is taken for all variables.
312
Apart from the properties of individual banks and their location in the network, we also consider some variables 313 that describe the banking system as a whole: The total number of bank in the banking system is denoted as NUMBER
314
BANKS, the fraction of assets recovered in case of failure is RECOVERY, the power law exponent λ of the distribution 315 of asset sizes is given by DISTRIBUTION, the normalized Herfindahl index of the banking system as measured by 316 the total assets is given by HERF BANKS. Finally we also record which bank has triggered the failures, denoted by TRIGGER. We set this variable to 1 for the largest bank, 2 for the second largest bank, 3 for a bank from the top decile 318 beyond these two banks, 4 for the second decile, and so on until 12 for the last decile.
319 Table 1 The idea behind a principal component analysis is to transform all variables such that they are uncorrelated with 336 each other. This is achieved by a rotation of the data such that they become orthogonal. In mathematical terms we can 337 state that our aim is to change the data such that the covariance matrix of the transformed data becomes diagonal, i. e.
338
only has entries along the main diagonal indicating that the covariances between the transformed variables are zero.
339
A more detailed description of this methodology can be found in Joliffe (2002) . Below we provide a brief outline of 340 the main steps in such an analysis.
341
Assume our explanatory variables, assembled into a matrix X, have been normalized with mean zero and variance new set X � = PX, we obtain a covariance matrix
XX � is a symmetric matrix and as 344 such it can be decomposed using the matrix of eigenvectors E of X: XX � = EDE � , where D is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. If we set P = E � and noting that P � = P −1 , we find that � Σ 6.5000
9.5000
12.0000 1.5 ≤ α < 2.0 2.0 ≤ α < 2.5 2.5 ≤ α < 3.0 3.0 ≤ α < 3.5 3.5 ≤ α ≤ 5. this rotation of which we choose the varimax methodology. Using an orthogonal matrix T we define R = PT and
the criterion used is to maximize the expression V = k=1 j=1 r jk − p j=1 r jk over T, where r i j denotes the 361 elements of the matrix R. The resulting matrix R contains the rotated factors as its vectors and these are used as the 362 basis for further analysis and are presented below. 
Identifying the main factors
364
Conducting a principal components analysis on our set of independent variables as outlined above, the eigenvalue 365 criterion suggests we consider 6 factors as their eigenvalues are above the threshold of 1 and the seventh eigenvalue 366 is significantly lower. The resulting rotated factor loadings are displayed in table 3. In order to interpret the factors 367 obtained, we identify for each variable the factor for which it has the highest factor loading and then seek to identify 368 common features in those variables that allow us to interpret these factors in the appropriate way for the remainder of 369 this paper; the names of these factors are shown in the top row of table 3.
370
The variables associated with the first factor are SIZE, CORRELATION, DISTRIBUTION, HERF BANKS,
371
NUMBER GIVEN, NUMBER TAKEN, and CLUSTERING. All these variables are directly or indirectly associ
This table shows the rotated factor loadings from conducting a principal components analysis using the varimax-criterion as described in the main text. The numbers in bold are those factor loadings that are highest for each of the variables considered. The heading of the columns provide the name given to each factor resulting from the analysis of those highest factor loadings. The second factor provides a good measure of the TIERING of the network. In a tiered network a small number of 383 banks (the core) will be highly connected with each other and have connections to the remaining banks (the periphery),
384
while the banks in the periphery are not much connected with each other but only to the core. This structure would 385 imply a small shortest path as most banks will be connected via the core in only a few steps, but also a low betweenness 386 as those in the periphery will have low values. Additionally, a core can easier be established if the banking system is 387 large enough. It is exactly these parameters that load highly with the second factor and thus a higher value corresponds 388 to a more tiered network.
389
Those variables that represent the balance sheet structure of banks, EQUITY, RESERVES, LOANS GIVEN, and
390
LOANS TAKEN are concentrated in the third factor and we therefore call this factor BALANCE SHEET. As a result 391 of the signs of the individual variables, we observe that overall a higher value of this factor is associated with more 392 loans being given and/or less deposits received, i. e. banks relying more on interbank loans rather than deposits and 393 equity to finance any loans to non-bank clients.
394
The fourth factor is associated with the Herfindahl index of the interbank loans given and taken, average neighbor 395 degree and the eigenvector centrality, thus representing aspects of the structure of the interbank loans and how they 396 are spread between banks. We therefore call this factor LOAN STRUCTURE. A larger value of this factor will be 397 associated with the concentration of interbank loans given and taken to only a few other banks of a similar size (HERF 398 TAKEN, HERF GIVEN, DEGREE NEIGHBOR), that have a high importance in the network (EV CENTRALITY).
399
The final two factors are straightforward as they are only associated with a single variable each, the recovery rate 400 and trigger bank, respectively, and for that reason we retain those names for these factors.
401
In the remainder of this paper we will only refer to these factors identified rather than individual variables. We Using the 10,000 banking systems we generated randomly as detailed above, we investigate in a first step how 417 many banks are affected by any contagion. To this effect we determined the fraction of banks that fail in each banking 418 system in which we observe contagion and then aggregated these data to show the decumulative distribution, i.e. one 419 minus the cumulative distribution function (CDF), as shown in figure 6 . In doing so we also distinguished between 420 the impact of different trigger banks and power law exponents on the extent of contagion.
421
Our results clearly show that while large banking crises are rare occurrences, they would nevertheless happen 422 regularly. There is approximately a 1 in 1,000 probability that more than half of all banks are failing and approximately 423 a 1 in 80 probability of more than 10% of banks failing. It has to be noted that this result does not include any effects
424
arising from the loss of confidence in the banking system and the subsequent withdrawal of funding in such a case,
425
although this would be highly likely in a real banking crisis and exacerbate the crisis. As would be expected, the 426 larger the bank triggering a crisis, the more likely and widespread a banking crisis will be on average. Nevertheless,
427
we found that on occasions the failure of a relatively small bank can cause a significant spread of failures in the 428 banking system. For a failing bank in the 9 th decile in terms of its size, i. e. a relatively small bank, there is still a 429 1 in 100 probability that more than 10% of all banks fail and in nearly 10% of cases at least one other bank fails as These findings show clearly that it is not only important to focus on preventing the biggest bank(s) from failing
434
("too big to fail"), but also that small banks can have a significant impact on the systemic risk. It is therefore important 
437
We also observe from figure 6(b) that the power law exponent of the size distribution of banks has a significant impact on the emergence of contagion as well as the extent of any banking crisis. We clearly see that a higher power banks in a banking system failing -of any crisis is smaller the higher the power law exponent is. Here the equal size of 442 banks prevents the spread as most losses that spread will be relatively small, hence they will be more quickly absorbed 443 within the banking system and less banks will fail. We also investigated the size of the banking system, as measured
444
by the number of banks, and did not find any meaningful relationship with the likelihood and extent of contagion. in is likely to exceed the cash reserves of the smaller banks, causing them to fail via our failure mechanism.
462
The second most important factor is the network topology of the interbank loans; here we find that a more inter Furthermore, we observe that a less tiered network structure reduces the likelihood of observing contagion. In considerably within its reasonable range, only have a limited impact on this probability, hence any policy measures to 478 address the contagion using those variables will have a very limited impact. We can therefore conclude that the "too 479 big to fail" paradigm is supported for the emergence of contagion as it is mainly the size of the initially failing bank 480 that determines whether contagion occurs.
481
In order to assess the impact of the initial failure on the banking system in more detail we also investigated the 482 fraction of banks that failed if contagion occurs. with each other and their larger size allows them to absorb any losses more easily amongst them and the spread of 487 failures will be limited. In particular, losses from the periphery are unlikely to spread as the core will in most cases 488 be able to absorb these losses. It is worth noting at this point that while a more tiered network reduces the fraction of has the more its losses will be spread and close-knit banks may well accumulate losses from multiple banks and only 495 because of this accumulation fail themselves. This influence is opposite to that it has on the probability of contagion in 496 the first place as once the capacity to absorb losses is breached, they will spread more easily in a closely interconnected 497 banking system. Once again the impact of interbank loans being called in on cash reserves has an equivalent impact 498 in all cases.
499
The next important factor is the structure of interbank loans. A banking system in which loans are given amongst 500 banks of more similar sizes actually increases the risk of more widespread bank failures as any losses will be quite 501 substantial. The similar size of banks giving interbank loans to each other will result in relatively large loans being 502 given, thus in the case of one bank failing, it will impose relatively large losses to those banks that provided these 503 loans, causing them to fail.
504
The final important factor for the spread of bank failures is the size of the bank initially triggering the default. As 505 would be expected, the larger the initial bank is the more widespread failures becomes; this arises from the fact that 506 with a bigger bank the amount of losses that need to be covered are larger and thus other banks are more likely to 507 be failing in turn. The other two factors, the balance sheet structure and the statistically insignificant recovery rate of 508 losses, have a negligible influence on the failure rate.
509
The influence of the four main factors on the failure rate is substantial and roughly of equal sensitivity. It is thus 510 particularly noteworthy that the balance sheet structure has no meaningful influence on the spread of failures, but that 511 network properties are clearly dominating. In contrast to the emergence of contagion, the paradigm of "too big to fail" 512 has only limited validity for the extent of a banking crisis but rather network aspects are more relevant. However, it is 513 more than a simple "too interconnected to fail" as the structure of these interconnections, especially the tiering, are of 514 relevance. aspects that any regulator seeking to affect the structure of the banking system has to be aware of, e. g. if through 525 allowing for mergers the power law exponent is increased or decreased through the break-up of large banks. Table 2 provides an overview of the key network characteristics and how they change with the power law exponent.
527
As the network increases its power law exponent, it becomes ever closer to a random network and this is reflected in 528 the variables. For the subsequent analysis we followed the same steps as above, including the determination of factors 529 that now will exclude the power law exponent and then conducted the same regressions. The factors identified are 530 similar to those observed before when we did not distinguish banking systems with different power law exponents, but 531 we observe that the network topology as well as the balance sheet structure easily splits into two separate factors. The Tables 5 and 6 show the sensitivities of the regressions as used before and we focus our discussion on this aspect.
534
From inspecting table 5 we clearly observe that as the power law exponent increases, the importance of the size 535 of the triggering bank as the dominant factor in determining the probability of contagion, remains largely unaffected.
536
As we observed before, the other factors are of much less importance. Nevertheless we do observe an increasing 537 importance of the reliance of the bank on interbank loans (LOAN STRUCTURE) as the power law exponent increases.
538
The same can be observed for the structure of the balance sheet while the opposite is true for the interconnectedness of 539 the network (TOPOLOGY). Thus overall we do not observe a significant difference to the results we obtained without 540 splitting our sample up by power law exponents; this gives us an indication of the stability and validity of our results.
541
Investigating the extent of the spread of bank failures from table 6, we observe that for higher power law exponents, the importance of tiering is remaining largely unaffected. This result re-enforces our previous assessment that the 545 structure of the network, in particular tiering, is an important determinant of the spread of any failure. We confirm
546
here that the balance sheet structure does not play an important role in this assessment and the size of the triggering 547 bank is of less importance for larger power law exponents.
548
Overall we conclude that the results derived before when considering banking system covering the full range of 549 power law exponents are robust to splitting the analysis up into banking systems with power law exponents in a small 550 range. In particular the "too big too fail" paradigm is again shown to be of limited validity and the network structure
551
to play an at least equally important role in the assessment of systemic risk. 
Comparison with random networks
553
As a further assessment of the stability of our results we conducted an analysis using a random network of in 554 terbank loans rather than a scale-free network, thus decoupling the connection between the distribution of bank sizes 555 and network structure. We maintained that the bank size has a power-law tail, but do not any longer assume that 556 the number of interbank loans given and received is correlated with the size of the bank, but rather that the network 557 structure is entirely random using the same overall connectivity as would have been emerged from a scale-free net work. Descriptive statistics of all variables considered are provided in appendix Appendix B. Firstly, inspecting the 559 distribution of the fraction of banks failing as well as the probability of observing contagion in figure 7 , we clearly 1.5 ≤ α < 2 2 ≤ α < 2.5 2.5 ≤ α < 3 3 ≤ α < 3.5 3. Table 6 : Sensitivity of the fraction of banks failing on the factors identified from a principal components analysis see that there are no noteworthy differences between the two network types.
561
As we conduct a principal components analysis we identify eight factors that are more difficult to interpret than 562 in the case of scale-free networks, appendix Appendix B provides details of the rotated factor loads. We find three 563 factors related to the topology of the interbank loan network, two related to the balance sheet, one describing the 564 concentration of interbank loans, one for the recovery rate and one for the trigger bank. No tiering emerges as a factor, 565 which is not surprising given that in a random network no such structure should emerge consistently.
566
Conducting a regression using these factors, we observe that the size of the trigger bank is the most important 567 determinant of whether contagion occurs or not, see although there the impact was also very limited.
571
With respect to the determinants of the extent of the crisis, we find that the most important factor is again BAL 572 ANCE SHEET II, followed by the size of the trigger bank, TOPOLOGY II, mainly representing the eigenvector 573 centrality, and TOPOLOGY I. While the interpretation of these results are not as easily conducted as in the case of 574 scale-free networks, it nevertheless confirms our assertion that the network structure is relevant for the spread of any 575 initial failure and should be taken into account in any assessment of the systemic risk of banking systems.
576
Although the choice of network structure is important for our results, we find some similar outcomes for a random
This table shows the estimates of a logit regression on the probability of a banking system exhibiting contagion (Prob (CONTAGION) ) and an OLS regression on the fraction of banks failing in those cases we observe contagion (FRACTION FAILING). We show the estimates of these regressions, with numbers in parentheses denoting the t-values, as well as a sensitivity measure. This measure uses the difference between the 25% and 75% quantile of the factor value (the number associated with CONSTANT and associated with � is the value of the median for each factor for comparison 
588
This result is very much in line with the current thinking in banking regulation and is shown in our model to be a valid 589 concern. It has, however, to be remembered that once the failure spreads, the influence of this variable on the extent 590 of the crisis will be very limited and other factors, primarily associated with the network structure of interbank loans,
591
will be become more important.
592
Interestingly, the balance sheet structure, the main focus of current regulation with minimum capital requirements, 593 maximal leverage and liquidity constraints, has no meaningful impact on whether contagion occurs. Thus, it might 594 be a well placed approach to prevent the failure of a bank in the first place (our initial trigger for the banking crisis 595 that we assumed to be exogenously given), but it has very limited impact on systemic risk itself, be it to limit the 596 occurrence of contagion or the extent of any banking crisis that develops.
597
The implications of our findings are that regulators seeking to address systemic risk should pay particular attention given to banks of similar size. While direct interference in the interbank market might be unfeasible, any regulator 603 could provide incentives to banks to take these aspects in consideration in their decision-making on providing and 604 seeking interbank loans. How these incentives are best achieved remains unanswered at this stage.
605
It should finally be noted that a more tiered banking system, i. e. a banking system which is dominated by a small 606 number of highly connected large banks, is less vulnerable to large banking crises. Thus a higher concentration in the 607 banking system is reducing systemic risk, provided a failure of those banks in the core can be prevented effectively.
Conclusions
609
We have developed a model of interbank loans given and received by banks of different sizes and with heteroge from contagion, it is the network structure that has a much more significant impact on this measure of systemic risk.
618
Our findings clearly suggest that aspects of the network structure are a determinant for the likelihood of a banking 619 crisis and in particular its extent. In contrast, current regulation exclusively focuses on the balance sheet structure of 620 banks, notably the amount of equity required and more recently liquidity aspects, neglecting any effects arising from 621 the network structure of interbank loans or other financial contracts between banks. Our analysis suggests that this 622 aspect has only a very limited impact on the systemic risk, although it might be more important to determine whether 623 a bank fails initially and causes a banking crisis. This deficit in current regulation has been shown to have a potentially 624 significant effect on the systemic risk that currently is not addressed.
625
Future research arising from this paper is manifold. Firstly, it would be worth looking at the determinants of the of the two mechanisms employed, the default and the failure mechanism, for the emergence and extent of contagion.
631
Finally we could extend our framework to determine an optimal regulation, e. g. by adjusting capital and liquidity 632 requirements to the network characteristics or even the individual position of a bank in the network with the aim 633 to reduce systemic risk. The banking system as developed here is free of any actual dynamics in the network itself. 6.5000
12.0000 Table A .12: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables investigated for 3.5 ≤ α ≤
5.0
This table shows the rotated factor loadings from conducting a principal components analysis using the varimax-criterion as described in the main text. The numbers in bold are those factor loadings that are highest for each of the variables considered. The heading of the columns provide the name given to each factor resulting from the analysis of those highest factor loadings. Table A .14: Rotated factor loadings from a principal components analysis for 2 ≤ α <
2.5
This table shows the rotated factor loadings from conducting a principal components analysis using the varimax-criterion as described in the main text. The numbers in bold are those factor loadings that are highest for each of the variables considered. The heading of the columns provide the name given to each factor resulting from the analysis of those highest factor loadings. This table shows the estimates of a logit regression on the probability of a banking system exhibiting contagion (Prob(CONTAGION)). We show the estimates of these regressions, with numbers in parentheses denoting the t-values, as well as a sensitivity measure. This measure uses the diff erence between the 25% and 75% quantile of the factor value (the number associated with CONSTANT and associated with � is the value of the median for each factor for comparison). Table A .18: Logit regressions for the probability of contagion split for diff erent ranges of the power law exponent
This table shows the estimates of an OLS regression on the fraction of banks failing in those cases we observe contagion (FRACTION FAILING) with the sample split up by diff erent ranges of the power law exponent. We show the estimates of these regressions, with numbers in parentheses denoting the t-values, as well as a sensitivity measure. This measure uses the diff erence between the 25% and 75% quantile of the factor value (the number associated with CONSTANT and associated with � is the value of the median for each factor for comparison). 6.5000
12.0000 Table B .20: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables investigated for random networks
This table shows the rotated factor loadings from conducting a principal components analysis using the varimax-criterion as described in the main text. The numbers in bold are those factor loadings that are highest for each of the variables considered. The heading of the columns provide the name given to each factor resulting from the analysis of those highest factor loadings. 
